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M. L. McBride, Editor
Entered as Second Class Matter, Dec. 9, 1936, at the Postoffice at
Dickinson, North Dakota, Under the Act of August 24, 1912.
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FOR THE BAR BRIEFS
The Grand Forks County Bar Association at a meet-
ing held in Grand Forks on Nov. 1, 1941 extended an
invitation to the Executive Committee to hold the
next annual convention of the Association in 1942 at
Grand Forks. The last previous convention was held
in Grand Forks on Sept. 6 and 7, 1935, at a time when
C. L. Foster of Bismarck was President.
The Board of Governors of the American Bar Asso-
ciation have selected Detroit, Michigan as the place of
the next annual convention to be held there during the
last week of August, 1942.
The previous annual convention of the American
Bar Association in Detroit was held on Sept. 2, 3 and
4, 1925, which your President then attended at a time
when Charles E. Hughes, now retired, was President
of the Association. His annual address there was a
noteworthy effort worthy of his great achievements
and his subsequent splendid services as Chief Justice
of our United States Supreme Court.
The American Bar Journal, in the November 1941
number, contains the incoming address of Walter P.
Armstrong before the House of Delegates as President
of our American Bar Association.
It was delivered at Indianapolis upon his election as
President of our American Bar Association.
It has been characterized by many members of our
American Bar Association as equal to a State Paper,
(Continued on next page)
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and it should be read by every member of our Association in this
State.
The outstanding accomplishment of the annual meeting at
Indianapolis was the minority report of Roscoe Pound, Dean
Emeritus of the Harvard Law School. He presented a very
strong presentation for the right of judicial review of administra-
tive proceedings.
It may be remembered that Roscoe Pound delivered an ad-
dress upon the Law of the Land at the annual meeting of our
Association held at Grand Forks on Sept. 6 and 7, 1927 at a time
when W. A. McIntyre was the President of the Bar Association.
HARRISON A. BRONSON, President.
REAL PROPERTY-JOINT TENANCY-MORTGAGE
CONSTITUTES SEVERANCE
Where land is devised to A and B as joint tenants and A
without the knowledge or consent of B gives a mortgage of his
undivided interest to C and A dies before redemption or fore-
closure, is the right of survivorship destroyed by said mortgage?
It is settled in law that a joint tenant may alienate or convey
to a stranger his portion or interest in the reality and thereby
defeat the right of survivorship, Wilken et al. v. Young, 144
Ind. 1, 41 N. E. 68 (1895). Having these rights and powers in
the land so held, there can be no sufficient reason urged why the
right of the joint tenant to mortgage the same should be denied.
The right of the joint tenant to mortgage is supported by the
following authorities: York v. Stone, 1 Selk. 158, 91 Eng. Rep. R.
146 (1709); Simpson's Lessee v. Ammons, 1 Bin. (Pa.) 175, 2
Am. Dec. 425 (1806).
If the joint tenant then has the power to mortgage his un-
divided interest what is the effect upon the joint tenancy and
survivorship? "A mortgage of a joint tenant of his share to a
stranger, would be effectual against survivorship, and may
amount to a severance of the joint estate." Washburn on Real
Property (5th Ed. 1887) Section 412. According to Corpus
Juris "The undivided interest of a joint tenant may be made the
subject of a mortgage by him without the consent or concurrence
of his cotenant, and to the extent of the mortgage lien the right
of survivors will be destroyed or suspended, and the equity of re-
demption at the death of the mortgagor tenant will be all that
will fall to his surviving cotenants." 33 C. J. 914. "The joint
tenancy is severed by the mortgage at any rate for the time
being, and until it is paid or redeemd." 2 Thompson on Real Pro-
perty (1st. ed. 1924) Section 1716.
The authority for the above rules of law is found in four
cases, York v. Stone, supra; Simpson's Lessee v. Ammons, supra;
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In re Pollard's Estate, 3 De G. & Sm. 541, 46 Eng. Rep. R 746
(1863), and Wilken et al. v. Young, supra. Of these four cases
the first three were decided in title theory jurisdictions. The
latter of the four cases cited is the only instance where the issue
was determined in a lien theory jurisdiction. The author has
little doubt but that at common law a mortgage constituted a
severance. With title passing, such a transaction would be
analagous to a conveyance, and would doubtless constitute a sev-
erance thus defeating the survivorship doctrine. But in a lien
theory jurisdiction where title is not transferred to the mortgagee,
but remains in the mortgagor with the mortgagee holding only a
lien, it is a more serious problem to spell out a severance of the
joint tenancy. Wilken v. Young, supra, is the one case holding
that in a lien theory state a mortgage constitutes a severance, and
the court made no attempt to solve this problem. Tiffany, in his
work on Real Property, (Vol. 1, 2d. Ed. 1920) Section 191 states
that the Wilken Case does not appear to accord with the common
law authorities to the effect, that the creation by a joint tenant
of a mere charge upon the land, or the grant of a mere incorporeal
thing, a privilege such as a right of profit, to be exercised upon
the land, is a nullity as against the right of the other joint tenant
as survivor.
If the rule as laid down in the Wilken Case is to be taken
with a liberal interpretation one can then state with authority
that a lien will constitute a severance of the joint tenancy thus
defeating the doctrine of survivorship. Surely the lien of a
judgment creditor would not create a severance. Before a judg-
ment lien will operate as a severance there must be a levy and
sale. 2 Thompson, Real Property, (1st. Ed. 1924) Section 1717.
The Wilken Case is the result of the application of the common
law rule to litigation in a state which has adopted the lien theory
of mortgages. The reason for the rule no longer exists in lien
theory states, since title is not transferred by a mortgage, but in
the face of this the Indiana court applied the common law rule.
Such is the result where stress is laid on the historical back-
ground rather than the reason and philosophy behind the rule.
With the lien statute the reason for the common law rule was
eliminated, but regardless of the reason behind the common law
rule the Indiana court followed it.
With there being but one case litigated on this issue, and
that being the Wilken case, it would appear that in North Dakota
a like result would occur. Thus as to property mortgaged by A
the right of survivorship is destroyed and the equity of redemp-
tion at the death of the mortgagor will be all that will fall to his
cotenant. Although under the rules of joint tenancy one cannot
properly make a blanket statement that a lien operates as a
severance, under the present cases the lien created by .a mortgage
will have to be recognized as a severance.
WILMER D. NEWTON,
Law Student
University of North Dakota
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LIMITATION OF ACTION WAIVER BY CORPORATION
FOOTNOTES
1 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Baltimore etc. Tel. Co., 26 Fed.
55 (1885).
2 Kelly Asphalt Block Co. v. Brooklyn Asphalt Co., 180 N. Y.
Supp. 805 (1920). No recovery could be had even if the presi-
dent was the owner of all the stock of the corporation receiving
the payment, and where such ownership was known to all of
them.
3 Ibid.
4 Indiana Flooring Co. v. District Nat. Bank, 280 Fed. 522
(1922).
5 Fletcher, Cyc. Corps. (Perm. Ed.) § 488.
6 Ibid.
7 Kennedy v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of Baltimore, 162
Md. 340, 159 Atl. 780 (Code Pub. Gen. Laws 1924 Act 57 6 1).
8 E. D. Morgan & Co. v. Merchants National Bank of Mem-
phis, 81 Tenn. (Lea) 234 (1884).
9 Fletcher, Cy. Copps. (Perm. Ed.) § 618
10 Wash. Say. Bank et al. v. Bucher's & Drovers 'et al., 107
Mo. 133, 17 S. W. 644 (1891).
11 Wells, Fargo v. Enright et al. and Commercial and Savings
Bank of San Jose, 49 L. R. A. 647 (1900). An agreement not to
plead the statute of limitations is not against public policy.
12 E. D. Morgan & Co. v. Merchants National Bank of
Memphis, 81 Tenn. (Lea) 234 (1884).
13 Phillip Carey Mfg. Co. v. Dean, 287 U. S. 623, 53 S. Ct. 78,
77 L. Ed. 541 58 F. (2d) 737 (1932). And when the president
and comptroller have this authority they may delegate it to the
secretary to execute a waiver for them.
14 Piedmont Wagon & Mfg. Co. v. U. S., 6 F. Supp. 125
(1934).
15 Hammond v. Carthage Sulfite and Paper Co., 34 F. (2d)
155 (1928).
16 Note in 63 L. R. A. 193.
17 Abenakis Spring Co. v. Chabonneau, 34 Que. K. B. 402.
18 Kelly Asphalt Co. v. Brooklyn Asphalt Co., 180 N. Y.
Supp. 805 (1920).
19 Cannel Coal Co. v. Luna, 144 S. W. 721 (Tex. 1912).
20 Jones v. Hughes, (1850) 5 Exch. 104, IX Mew's Digest
131.
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21 W. J. Hein v. Geavelle Farmers Ely. Co., 78 A. L. R. 631
(1931). Here the directors owned most of the notes, and the
corporation was insolvent at the time the part payment was
made just for the purpose of reviving the claim on the notes.
22 Fletcher, Cyc. Corps. (Perm. Ed.) § 549.
23 Wych v. East India Co., (1734) 24 Eng. Rep. 1078, IX
Mew's Digest 39.
24 Allen v. Smith, 129 U. S. 465, 9 S. Ct. 338, 32 L. Ed. 732
(1889).
25 In re Sheppard's Estate, 180 Pa. 57, 36 Atl. 422 (1897).
26 Brookfield Nat. Bank v. Kimble et al., 76 Ind. 195 (1877).
27 Cheshire v. Parker, 207 N. C. 364, 177 S. E. 21 (1934).
28 Waite et al. v. McKee, 95 Ark. 124, 128 S. W. 1028 (1910).
29 7 R. C. L. 510.
30 Johnson v. Albany & Susquehanna R. R. Co., 54 N. Y. 416
(1873).
31 Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 620, 6 S. Ct. 209, 29 L. Ed.
483 (1885).
32 41 A. L. R. 925.
OUR SUPREME COURT HOLDS
In the North Dakota Mill & Elevator Assn., Pltf. and Applt., vs. Hartford
Steam Boiler Inspec. & Ins. Co., Deft. and Respt.
That the Industrial Commission of the State of North Dakota consisting
of the Governor, the Attorney General and the Commissioner of Agriculture
and Labor of the State of North Dakota, is a state agency charged with the
operation, management and control of The North Dakota Mill and Elevator
Association. Pursuant to the statute (chap. 191, S. L. 1933) "all orders,
rules, regulations, by-laws and written contracts adopted or authorized by
the Commission shall, before becoming effective, be approved by the Gover-
nor, a& chairman, and shall not be in force unless approved and signed by
him," and (chap. 193, S. L. 1933) " * * Title to property pertaining to the
operation of the Association shall be obtained and conveyed in the name of
'The State of North Dakota, doing business as the North Dakota Mill and
Elevator Association.' Written instruments shall be executed in the name of
the State of North Dakota, signed by any two members of the Industrial
Commission, of whom the Governor shall be one * *." The Commission at a
meeting held on April 26, 1939, on motion of one of the members thereof, un-
animously resolved to cancel ahd terminate certain policies of insurance then
in force covering property of the Association. The minutes of the meeting
showing the action thus taken were signed by the Governor and the other two
members of the Commission. The insurance company with which the poli-
cies were written, refused to repay the unearned premium in the amount
claimed and demanded by the Commission, whereupon suit to recover the
same was instituted. On the trial evidence tending to show that written
acttion of the Commission cancelling the policies of insurance was given to
the company by the secretary of the Commission and the policies surrenderea
for cancellation and that the company waived any objection on account of
irregularity or insufficiency in the notice of cancellation or in the manner
and method of the surrender of the policies, was offered and ruled inadmis-
sible on the ground that the policies could not be cancelled under the pro-
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visions of the statute above quoted except by written notice signed by the
Governor and one of the other members of the Commission. HELD, for rea-
sons stated in the opinion, that this ruling was erroneous. Appeal from the
District Court of Cass County, Holt, J. Action to recover money. From a
judgment for the defendant, plaintiff appeals.
REVERSED AND NEW TRIAL ORDERED. Opinion of the Court by
Nuessle, J.
In Peter F. Kelsch, Jr., Pltf. and Applt., vs. R. M. Dickson, Justice of the
Peace in and for Stark County, North Dakota, Deft. and Respt.
That where the district court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of a
case, and the parties to a cause of action appear before the court, so as to
give the court jurisdiction of the persons, the decision of the court made
therein is binding upon the parties affected until modified or reversed.
That the record is examined, and it is held: the trial court was justified
in denying a writ of mandamus sought by the petitioner.
Appeal from the District Court of Stark County, Hon. Harvey J. Miller,
Judge. AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Burr, Ch. J.
In State of North Dakota, Pltf. and Applt., vs. Grand Forks, a quasi
Municipal Corporation, Deft. and Respt.
That a county treasurer, in collecting taxes and rentals of school lands
for the state, does not act as the agent of the county but as an individual
designated by his official name to collect for the state. (Sections 2156 and 326,
C. L. 1913).
That statutes directing county treasurers to collect taxes and school land
rentals for the state and providing for remittance thereof to the state treas-
urer contemplate that county treasurers shall, after collection, hold such
funds as individuals in their official capacity subject to the orders of desig-
nated state officers.
That an allegation in an answer that a county treasurer deposited funds
belonging to the state in a depositary for public funds does not warrant an
implication that such funds were deposited in the name of the county.
That statute which declares that each county shall be responsible for all
state taxes levied imposes a condition of potential liability or accountability
and a county's duty to account for state taxes may be met by a showing that
the county officers have adhered strictly to the statutor directions of the
State Legislature and have acted with honesty, prudence and diligence.
That where a county treasurer was required by state statute, under a
penalty of a misdemeanor, to deposit the proceeds of state tax collections in
a depositary for public funds and was exempted from all liability for losses
resulting from the failure of such depositary, an answer by a county, in a
suit brought by the State to recover state taxes collected by the county's
treasurer, alleging that such taxes had been deposited by the treasurer in a
duly designated depositary for public funds and had been lost through the
insolvency of the depositary, stated a sufficient accounting for the state
taxes collected ad a defense to the action.
Appeal from the District Court of Grand Forks County, Swenson, J.
AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Burke, J.
In Ford Motor Company, a corporation, Pit. and Applt., vs. Berta E. Bak-
er, State Auditor, Deft. and Respt.
That Section 186 of the Constitution of North Dakota (Article 53 of the
Amendments to the Constitution, p. 497. Laws 1939) provides that no money
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shall be paid out of the State Treasury except after appropriation by the
legislature, but contains a proviso "that there is hereby appropriated the
necessary funds * * required for refunds made under the provisions of * * the
State Income Tax Law." It is held that such proviso operates to appropriate
moneys required for the payment of a judgment that had been rendered
against the State prior to the time the proviso was adopted as a part of a
constitutional amendment.
That the State cannot be held to the payment of interest on any claim
against it unless bound by an act of the Legislature or by a lawful contract
of its executive officers made within the scope of their duly constitutec
authority.
That the State is not liable to pay interest on a claim for a refund of
income taxes illegally assessed against, and paid to the State Treasurer by, a
taxpayer under compulsion since there is no legislative enactment which
either directly or by implication imposes such liability upon the state or evi-
dences consent by the state to pay such interest. Neither is the State liabie
to pay interest on a judgment rendered against it for such claim.
. Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, Hon. Fred Jansonius,
J. Mandamus proceeding by Ford Motor Company against State Auditor to
compel her to draw a warrant on State Treasurer for amount of plaintiff's
judgment. From a judgment in favor of defendant, plaintiff appeads. RE-
VERSED AND REMANDED. Opinion of Court by Berry, Dist. J. sitting in
place of Morris, J., disqualified.
In David Hamilton, Pltf. and Respt., vs. City of Bismarck, a municipal
corporation, Deft. and Applt.
That in constructing a sewer system, a city acts in governmental capa-
city.
That a municipal corporation is not liable for damages caused by an
over-flow of its sewer occasioned by extraordinary rains or floods.
That Section 14 of the North Dakota Constitution does not deal with
damages resulting from the negligence of public corporations or their agents
but only with those damages that are a consequence of the exercise of the
power of eminent domain.
That where the right to take or damage private property for public use
is acquired by contract, and nothing to the contrary appears, the acquisition
is presumed to be accompanied by the same rights as though the power of
eminent domain had been exercised in accordance with statutory and consti-
tutional provisions.
Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, Hon. R. G. McFar-
land, Judge. REVERSED. Opinion of the Court by Morris, J. Burr, J. dis-
senting.
In Tilda Nelson, Pltf., Respt., Applt., vs. A. R. Scherling and Sophia Scher-
ling, Defts., Applts., Respts.
That a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict does not go to
the weight of evidence. In case of an adverse verdict the evidence is con-
sidered in the light most favorable to the party obtaining the verdict; and
where, upon the whole record, there is no issue of fact to submit to the jury,
so that the moving party would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law,
the motion for judgment nothwithstanding the verdict should be granted.
However, if, upon the whole record, it is reasonable to believe the defects in
the evidence may be supplied upon a new trial, so as to present an issue for
the jury, the trial court should deny the motion for judgment nothwithstand-
ing the verdict, and grant a new trial, when the motion is made in the alterna-
tive.
Appeal from the District Court of Cass County, Hon. P. G. Swenson,
Judge. AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Burr, Ch. J.

